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Abstract 
More and more legislative decisions are reached in early stages of the codecision 
procedure through informal negotiations among representatives of the EU institutions. 
This study argues that the European Parliament has an advantage in such negotiations 
relative to the Council due to the latter’s limited organisational resources to handle the 
increased legislative workload under the codecision procedure. The main implication 
of this theoretical argument is that the Parliament’s impact on the content of 
legislation should be higher when informal negotiations are conducted rather than 
when agreement is reached at the end of the procedure in conciliation. To examine 
this claim, we conduct a quantitative comparative study of the success of the 
Parliament’s amendments in two legislative decision-making processes in the field of 
Transport. The results reveal that the EP’s influence during codecision is indeed larger 
in the case of an early agreement. 
Keywords 
Codecision, Council of Ministers, European Parliament, informal institutions, 
institutional choice, legislative decision-making.   
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Reconsidering the European Parliament’s Legislative Power:  
Formal  vs. Informal Procedures 
I. Introduction 
The legitimacy of democratic political systems can be assessed through a number of 
criteria. As discussed by Holzhacker and Thomassen (2007) in the introduction to this 
special issue, liberal democratic theory includes a number of standards. Amongst the 
most important classic, liberal democratic principles are the representativeness and 
accountability of political decision-makers. These norms refer to the input side of the 
political system. However, part of the legitimacy of a political system derives also 
from its output (Scharpf, 1999). Indeed, the efficiency of policy production and the 
effectiveness of policies resulting from decision-making are important factors that are 
often considered in evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. Although in 
principle not mutually exclusive, many authors argue that, in practice, there are often 
trade-offs involved between output- and input legitimacy (see e.g. Héritier, 2003; 
Rhinard, 2002; Shackleton & Raunio, 2003). As the European Union (EU) has grown 
into a full-blown political system (Hix, 2005), it also faces this basic dilemma in its 
institutional design of day-to-day decision-making.  
This study focuses on one specific instance of this general trade-off: the 
organization of the interaction-process of the European Parliament (EP) and the 
Council of Ministers in legislative decision-making under the codecision procedure. 
The codecision procedure grants the EP equal legislative rights next to the Council. A 
main rationale of member states for granting the EP such powers was to increase the 
legitimacy of EU decision-making by increasing its representativeness, particularly in  
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policy areas where qualified majority voting replaced the unanimity rule in the 
Council and hesitant governments could now be overruled. In terms of the distinction 
made above, the goal was to enhance the input legitimacy of the EU by giving the 
only institution whose members are directly elected more powers to shape EU 
policies. But besides empowering the EP, the codecision procedure also introduced a 
somewhat cumbersome formal decision-making process, consisting of three readings 
by both the EP and the Council. The result was a considerable prolongation of the 
legislative process (Golub, 1999). To counter-act these tendencies, the three main EU 
institutions started to engage in informal negotiations before and between their formal 
readings (Farrell & Héritier, 2003; Shackleton & Raunio, 2003). While these so-called 
trilogue negotiations increase EU output legitimacy in terms of decision-making 
efficiency, the opaqueness of these processes and the disproportional influence of the 
few actors that are directly involved in the negotiations endanger the original goal of 
fostering the input legitimacy of the EU.  
While decision-making in the Council has always been a rather secretive 
process, trilogue negotiations now also introduce an element of obscurity into EP 
proceedings (Shackleton & Raunio, 2003). Thus, it seems particularly interesting to 
investigate the consequences of engaging in trilogue negotiations for the legislative 
influence of the EP. Are there incentives for the EP in terms of policy gains to engage 
in such negotiations that might outweigh the losses occurred in terms of input 
legitimacy? It is argued that the Parliament, particularly in the form of the actors 
directly concerned with a certain dossier, such as the rapporteur and the Committee 
chairman, has a short-term interest to engage in informal negotiations to reach an 
early agreement since it is better able to extract policy concessions from the Council  
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in this stage than later on in the Conciliation Committee. This is so not because of 
some feature inherent in the informal institution of trilogue negotiations itself. 
Because of its very limited resources in terms of personnel and time (Farrell & 
Héritier, 2003; Shackleton & Raunio, 2003), the Council is simply keener to avoid 
conciliation. Although an early agreement is beneficial to both institutions in terms of 
efficiency, the Council has more incentives to come to an early agreement than the 
Parliament. Unless the salience of an issue for the Council outweighs its anticipated 
costs of engaging in conciliation, it will agree to participate in informal trilogues and 
make policy concessions to avoid conciliation. In contrast, the Parliament has no 
special incentive to favour trilogues over conciliation. Regarding the outcomes of 
trilogue negotiations, more influence of the Parliament is expected than under 
conciliation. 
This claim and related implications of the theory are examined through a 
controlled comparison of the outcome of two legislative decision-making processes. 
The influence of the Parliament is compared across two legislative proposals in the 
field of transport, which were matched on important characteristics to keep alternative 
explanatory factors constant. The first case concerns a directive on minimum 
conditions for the implementation of social legislation relating to road transport 
activities, which was only agreed in the conciliation committee. The second case 
regards the directive on driving licences, which was formally adopted by the Council 
in second reading after an informal agreement with the Parliament had been reached. 
As in previous research, amendment adoption rates are used to measure the EP’s 
influence, but also some novel indicators are employed to increase the leverage of the 
theory test. In general, the empirical evidence of the case studies is consistent with the  
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theoretical argument. The claim that Parliament’s influence on legislative outcomes is 
larger when agreement has been reached early in the procedure through informal 
negotiations is broadly corroborated. However, it is also maintained that informal 
trilogue negotiations are not the causal factor enhancing the Parliament’s influence, 
since the decision to conduct such informal negotiations in the first place is not 
independent of the preferences, the salience attached to an issue, and the 
organizational resources of the actors involved. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, the development and 
the relevance of the codecision procedure and the informal practices related to it are 
discussed in more detail. Then, a brief overview of existing theories that make claims 
regarding the influence of the different actors involved in the procedure is given. This 
is followed by a description of the theory to be tested in the remainder of the study. In 
the third part, the research design is discussed. Special attention is given to the case 
selection, the measurement and coding of Parliament’s influence, as well as the 
derivation of testable hypotheses. The results of the analysis are presented in section 
four. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the findings in terms of 
the legitimacy of the EU and some suggestions for future research on the topic. 
II. The Codecision Procedure and Informal Negotiations 
The codecision procedure was first introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht and consists 
of three reading stages. In the first two readings, the Council and the EP consider each 
other’s amendments to the Commission proposal. If no agreement is reached in these 
stages, the issue is referred to a Conciliation committee composed of representatives 
of the two institutions. It is then the task of the conciliation committee to agree on a  
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‘joint text’. Subsequently, this joint text has to be endorsed by both institutions in 
their third readings. The codecision procedure was significantly changed through the 
Amsterdam treaty. According to the Maastricht provisions, the Council could 
reintroduce its common position in the third reading when no agreement had been 
reached on a joint text in the conciliation committee. The EP could then only accept 
or reject but not amend the reintroduced common position. In the Amsterdam treaty, it 
was stipulated that the law would fail if no agreement could be reached in the 
conciliation committee. Thus, under the Maastricht provisions, the Council could 
make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the EP in the last stage of the procedure when 
conciliation failed. In contrast, according to the Amsterdam rules, the EP has equal 
formal powers to influence the decision-making outcome. 
Since its introduction in 1993, the codecision procedure has steadily grown in 
relevance. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999, the 
procedure was not only changed to guarantee more EP influence, but also its 
applicability was significantly widened. This is reflected in the subsequent increase of 
the number of laws adopted according to this procedure. A total of 403 legislative acts 
were enacted under the codecision procedure between 1 May 1999 and 30 April 2004 
(European Parliament 2005, p. 10). The total number of codecision files adopted is 
two and a half times higher than the number of proposals concluded through 
codecision during the previous five-year period from 1994 to 1999 under the 
Maastricht provisions. The annual average number of codecision reports rose from 33 
under the Maastricht Treaty to 80 under Amsterdam.  
In response to practical necessities and the growing legislative workload under 
codecision, the formal decision-making procedure was complemented with informal  
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practices that soon became institutionalized. Informal trilogues, consisting of 
representatives of the three main institutions, were originally used after the second 
reading stage to prepare the Conciliation Committee meetings (Shackleton, 2000). 
The Council is usually represented by the deputy permanent representative and the 
working group chairman of the state holding the rotating Council presidency. The 
Parliament’s delegation is made up of the chairman of the relevant committee, 
rapporteur and possibly shadow-rapporteurs from other political groups. Also, a 
director or director-general participates as a representative of the Commission. Given 
the benefits of these meetings in terms of faster and more effective decision-making, 
they soon became established practice for the interaction of the Council and the 
Parliament under codecision (Farrell & Héritier, 2003). A new provision in the 
Amsterdam treaty, allowing for early agreements already in the first reading, further 
spurred the extension of these arrangements. In general, it was the Council that sought 
to extend the trilogue negotiations ‘backwards’ to the second and first reading, in 
order to keep the increased workload manageable (Farrell & Héritier, 2003). 
--- Table 1 here --- 
Table 1 clearly shows the accompanying increase in early agreements over time. 
Under the Maastricht provisions, 40% of the files still required conciliation. The 
overall figure for the 1999 to 2004 period has gone down to 22%. Indeed, 50% of the 
acts were passed at second and 28% even at first reading. Overall, only 22% of all 
laws under Amsterdam rules were adopted following conciliation. Whereas the 
proportion of conciliation meetings has dropped steadily, early agreements have 
become more frequent and important, highlighting the relevance of informal rules and 
procedures next to formal institutions.  
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III. Theoretical Perspectives on Legislative Decision-Making under Codecision 
Since the introduction of the codecision procedure in the Maastricht treaty, there is a 
burgeoning field of research investigating the role of the EP in EU policy-making. A 
detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper and has been 
conducted extensively elsewhere (Hörl, Warntjen, & Wonka, 2005; Kasak, 2004; 
Rittberger, 2000). Instead, the literature is summarized according to the type of causal 
factors that are deemed most relevant in accounting for the power of different actors 
under codecision. Two approaches are identified: first, the ‘legalistic’ approach 
stresses the constitutional rules as codified in the treaties as determining actors’ 
influence. In contrast, the ‘negotiation’ approach emphasizes the importance of actual 
practices that developed along the formal treaty provisions. 
The formal empowerment of the EP in EU legislative politics has created a 
rich formal-theoretic literature on its effect on policy outcomes and the institutional 
balance of power between the Commission, the Council and the EP (e.g. Crombez, 
1996; Crombez, 1997; for a review, see Dowding, 2000; Steunenberg, 1994; George 
Tsebelis, 1994; George Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000). Although considerable differences 
between these works exist (see e.g. Crombez, Steunenberg, & Corbett, 2000; Garrett, 
Tsebelis, & Corbett, 2001), a common feature is that they take the constitutional 
provisions of the treaties as their starting point for modelling the behaviour of 
different actors. The legalistic approach emphasizes the importance of formal 
institutions such as the right of initiative, the right to amend or veto proposals, and the 
voting rule applicable to make decision within the Council and the Parliament. 
Furthermore, the formal decision-making procedures such as codecision are supposed 
to reflect the actual sequence of decision-making. In sum, this approach stresses  
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formal rules and procedures as affecting the influence of different actors on policy 
outcomes in the EU. In contrast to the second approach, it largely ignores rather 
informal behavioural practices. However, it is questionable whether a focus on 
constitutional rules and procedures alone can form a solid basis for explaining and 
understanding current decision-making under the codecision procedure.  
Particularly practitioners such as Shackleton (2000; Shackleton & Raunio, 
2003) and Corbett (Crombez et al., 2000; Garrett et al., 2001) have long maintained 
that the codecision procedure consists of more than just the rules implied by the 
treaty. Recently, also Farrell and Héritier (2003) have argued that the introduction of 
the codecision procedure has given rise to a “plethora of informal institutions”, and 
that these, in turn, have affected subsequent treaty negotiations. All of these studies 
argue that informal negotiations have become an important mode of decision-making 
under codecision. In another related work, Farrell and Héritier (2004) study the 
changes in the relationship between the Council and the EP under codecision and its 
implications for intraorganizational processes. In particular, they argue that the move 
from formal sequential to informal simultaneous interaction between the EP and the 
Council has empowered so-called “relais actors” (Farrell & Héritier, 2004), such as 
the rapporteurs of the EP and the presidency of the Council, mainly at the expense of 
actors that do not participate directly in informal negotiations. 
To sum up, we argued that research on the EP’s influence in EU policy-
making under the co-decision procedure can be grouped into two broad classes: work 
stressing the constitutionally prescribed decision-making process and work stressing 
informal bargaining processes. But neither the legalistic nor the negotiation 
perspective discusses the conditions under which one or the other mode of decision- 
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making prevails. Since actual decision-making follows very different patterns, this is a 
clear omission in the literature. Sometimes the decision-making process follows 
neatly the sequence outlined in the treaty, while at other times an act is already 
adopted in first or second reading after an agreement has been reached in informal 
trilogue negotiations. As the statistics above show, none of these trajectories can be 
neglected. What is needed then is not only a theory of decision-making that has 
implications for the influence of different actors under one or the other mode of 
decision-making, but also a theory of institutional choice that elaborates on the 
conditions under which actors will agree to interact in one or the other mode. We 
describe a simple version of such a model in the next section. 
IV. Endogenous Institutional Choice and its Consequences 
The basic building blocks of the model are actors that make conscious and strategic 
choices about the precise rules governing their interaction, within the constraints set 
by higher-level rules (see also Jupille, 2004). The relevant actors are the EP, the 
Commission and the Council. For the purpose of this study, they are treated as unitary 
actors
1. Corresponding to legal reality, it is assumed that the default rules are the 
legislative procedures laid out in the treaties. If no agreement on the application of 
other rules can be reached, the constitutional procedures are the ‘fall-back’ rules. 
However, the three collective actors can effectively supplement constitutional 
procedures through other rules set up by mutual consent and these informal rules can 
fundamentally change the nature of the decision-making process. 
Political actors are assumed to be primarily concerned with realizing their 
most preferred policy outcome. However, they also have a tight schedule and  
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therefore have to prioritize. In their decision on whether or not to engage in informal 
negotiations, each collective actor compares the expected outcome of the decision-
making process following the codecision procedure against the expected outcome of 
the trilogue negotiations. In line with previous research (Crombez, 2000; Tsebelis & 
Garrett, 2000), it is assumed that the conciliation committee is the crucial stage during 
the codecision procedure. In the conciliation committee, Parliament and Council 
determine the final outcome of the proposal, each institution having the same 
prerogatives and powers. As a result, a compromise outcome exactly in the middle 
between the most preferred outcomes of the actors can be expected. In an 
environment of perfect information, where the actors know each other’s preferences 
with certainty, the Commission would start the procedure by making a proposal that 
already reflects this outcome, the Parliament and the Council would see no need for 
changes, and the proposal would be adopted by the Council without amendments in 
the first reading. If the preferences of actors are not commonly known, however, the 
haggling might last until the last stage of the procedure, the conciliation committee.  
At each stage of the procedure, the actors then ask themselves whether the 
expected outcome of the conciliation committee is still better than the expected 
outcome of trilogue negotiations. Trilogue negotiations can be characterized similar to 
bargaining in the conciliation committee. The Council and Parliament have equal 
powers: both can make offers and counter-offers and both have to agree to the final 
result. One distinction to conciliation committee negotiations is that the Commission 
also has to agree to the final outcome; otherwise it can withdraw the proposal. In 
practice, this is most likely an irrelevant feature of trilogue negotiations, since the 
Commission usually favours some change in policy to none at all, otherwise it would  
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not introduce a proposal in the first place. Thus, the position of the Commission is 
practically irrelevant in trilogue negotiations. A more crucial characteristic of trilogue 
negotiations is that interactions among the institutions continue according to the 
codecision procedure when negotiations break down. Thus, the proposal does not fail 
with the failure of negotiations, but continues its progress through the formal 
procedure until renewed negotiations are started in the conciliation committee.  
Although the Parliament and the Council are officially equal partners in 
trilogue negotiations, it is argued that the ‘de facto’ bargaining power of an 
organization depends crucially on its willingness to prolong the decision-making 
process and, particularly, to engage into conciliation committee negotiations. The less 
‘afraid’ a collective actor is of the threat point constituted by the conciliation 
committee negotiations and the associated policy outcome, the more concessions can 
it extract from its bargaining partner. With regard to the European Parliament and the 
Council, the latter is assumed to be more eager to avoid conciliation than the former. 
The resources in terms of personnel and time on the side of the Council are much 
more restrictive than on the Parliament’s side. The Council is represented in 
conciliation mainly by the deputy ambassadors of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Bostock, 2002), which are at the same time responsible for 
overseeing and coordinating the work of dozens of working groups and preparing the 
minister meetings in six policy areas covering the bulk of Community legislation. 
Given the limited resources in terms of time and personnel, the Council cannot afford 
to pursue all files through the whole procedure, but has to restrict its attention to 
issues that it considers most important. In contrast, the Parliament’s work is divided 
among its 20 standing committees, each with a larger number of members and its own  
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supporting staff. Of course, this does not mean that the Parliament is always 
indifferent between an early agreement and a conciliation agreement, only that it is 
generally more patient than the Council in this respect and therefore has a bargaining 
advantage.  
To summarize, it is argued that neither a focus on constitutional rules nor on 
informal conventions produces a satisfying explanation of legislative decision-making 
under the codecision procedure. Instead, a theory was proposed that incorporates both 
features into a common framework. In this theory, actors decide strategically about 
whether or not to engage in informal trilogue negotiations. They weigh the benefits of 
an ‘early agreement’ against the outcome of conciliation negotiations. While all actors 
value policy as such, they also incur opportunity costs when having to hold 
conciliation talks. The opportunity costs of conciliation are higher for the Council 
than for the Parliament, equipping the latter with a bargaining advantage in trilogues. 
In effect, the Parliament’s willingness to come to an early agreement is ‘bought’ with 
policy concessions by the Council. It is this last implication of the theory that is tested 
in the current paper: other things equal, the legislative influence of the Parliament 
should be higher if agreement is reached by trilogue than if it is reached by 
conciliation negotiations.  
V. Research Design 
To test this claim empirically, a comparative case study was conducted according to 
the most similar systems design. The cases were selected in such a way as to 
approximate an experimental study. The aim was to select cases that are identical in as 
many potentially influential characteristics as possible, except for the explanatory  
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factor of interest. Any differences in the outcome variable that corresponds to the 
variation of the explanatory factor among these cases can then be attributed to the 
explanatory factor.  
Case Selection 
As a result of this approach, two legislative proposals in the field of Transport were 
selected for the analysis: one directive relating to the implementation of legislation on 
driving time limits for road transport and another directive effectively establishing a 
Europe-wide driving license
2. They match with regard to a multitude of 
characteristics. Firstly, it took a relatively long period of time for both dossiers to be 
adopted and the Parliament proposed a relatively large number of amendments to both 
proposals, pointing to an equally high level of preference divergence among actors. 
Secondly and more importantly, the proposals relate to the same policy subfield and 
are discussed during almost the same time period. The proposals for the driving 
licences directive and the driving time implementation directive were both adopted by 
the Commission on 21 October 2003. Agreement on the former was officially reached 
in the third reading on 2 February 2006 and on the latter in the second reading on 27 
March 2006. Both dossiers deal with topics of land transport.  
Overall, the correspondence in time and subject means that the directives were 
discussed while the same people were in power in the Council and the Parliament, 
respectively. In Parliament, the same committee was concerned with the acts, and 
when the composition of the plenary and the committee changed in 2004, it did so in 
both cases. Similarly, the acts were discussed in the Council by the same working 
party, the same Coreper formation, and the same ministers, even when national  
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governments changed during the time period under study. Thus, the design controls 
for a host of alternative explanations for varying EP influence which stress the 
importance of ideological distance between the institutions, be it in terms of support 
for regulatory activity (left-right) or for European integration (pro-contra 
supranationalism). Indeed, on a macro-level, when considering the EU political space 
as structured by one fundamental conflict dimensions both within and between 
institutions and the EP and the Council as unitary actors represented by their pivotal 
voters, the current design allows in principle for sound inferences about the effect of 
informal institutions on the relative influence of actors. 
Parliament’s Influence and its Measurement 
But of course, the practical problem of how to measure an actor’s influence remains. 
First of all, it is necessary to circumscribe the concept to be measured more closely. 
The EP’s overall influence on European integration is not of interest here. Nor is the 
EP’s overall influence on the quantity and content of EU legislation. In line with the 
focus on the effects of the choice of institutional arrangements, this study focuses on 
the Parliament’s impact on the content of a proposal during and through the 
Codecision procedure. Note also that the intention of this study is not to produce 
conclusions about the EP’s impact in comparison to the other collective EU actors, 
only about the EP’s relative impact under different institutional rules. Therefore, the 
main dependent variable for the analysis is broadly defined as the change brought 
about in the content of a proposal by intentional activities of the EP after the 
codecision procedure has been initiated by the Commission. The procedure starts with 
the transmission of a proposal by the Commission to the other institutions and usually  
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ends with the publication of the adopted act in the EU’s official journal. Any changes 
in the text of the proposal that occurred during the procedure and can be attributed to 
the preferences and behaviour of the Parliament are considered to be manifestations of 
its impact on legislation.  
In line with previous research on the EP’s influence (Kasak, 2004; Kreppel, 
1999, 2002; Tsebelis, Jensen, Kalandrakis & Kreppel, 2001; Tsebelis & Kalandrakis, 
1999), the adoption rate of EP amendments is used to measure this variable. Under the 
assumption that the Parliament’s public demands for changes in the proposal reflect 
its sincere policy preferences, the proportion of amendments adopted to the number of 
amendments proposed is a relatively unambiguous measure of EP influence. Of 
course, it is questionable whether all amendments are of equal importance. An 
obvious difference exists between those amendments that propose changes to the 
recitals and those amendments that refer to actual articles of the legal act. In contrast 
to articles, recitals are not part of the legally binding text of an act, and it is 
straightforward to draw a distinction between these two types of amendments. But in 
the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes an important provision and a 
method to identify these provisions a priori, the second-best solution for the remaining 
amendments is to treat them all as being of equal importance
3.  
Data Collection and Coding 
The data for the analysis was collected from documents released by the EU 
institutions. The fate of all amendments to the Commission proposal suggested by 
Parliament was observed throughout the decision-making process and the degree of 
adoption of amendments coded according to a five-point scale ranging from  
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‘adopted’, ‘largely adopted’, ‘partially adopted’, and ‘modified’ to ‘adopted’
4. In the 
case of the drivers’ licence directive, the common position of the Council was 
accepted by Parliament without amendments in the second reading. Hence, it was 
sufficient to compare the text of the common position with the EP amendments and to 
make an assessment in how far the amendments were incorporated into the Council’s 
text.  
In contrast, the proposal for the driving time implementation directive went 
through all three official stages of the codecision procedure, which meant that the 
Parliament reintroduced old or made new amendments to the Council’s common 
position. In this case, the coding of the EP’s influence followed a three-step 
procedure. First, as for the drivers’ licence directive, it was examined to what degree 
the Council’s common position included Parliament’s first reading amendments. 
Then, a similar comparison was made between the Parliament’s second reading 
amendments and the final legislative act. Finally, taking into account in how far the 
second reading amendment was a reintroduced or a new one, an overall score of 
amendment acceptance was derived from the amendment acceptance scores for the 
first and second reading. While reintroduced amendments were not counted towards 
the denominator of the influence measure, newly drafted amendments were taken as 
additional independent observations
5. 
Note that this last step in the coding rule differs from practice in previous 
empirical work on amendment success which takes second reading amendments as 
independent observations no matter whether they were reintroduced old amendments 
or newly drafted ones. Since we are not primarily interested in the influence of the EP 
in a certain stage of the codecision procedure, but rather in the EP’s influence during  
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the procedure as a whole, the coding scheme proposed here is more appropriate. For 
example, the nonsensical situation is avoided that one and the same amendment is 
counted twice and once coded as ‘not adopted’ (in the Council’s common position) 
and once as ‘adopted’ (in the final legal act). Considering the legislative process as a 
whole, the rejection by the Council of first reading amendments does not matter when 
the same amendments are subsequently reintroduced by Parliament in its second 
reading. In this situation, only the degree of adoption of the last amendment is 
relevant. Similar reasoning applies to situations where amendments were ‘largely’ or 
‘partially’ incorporated into the common position. If the original amendment was 
completely reintroduced in the second reading, the EP had an influence on the final 
policy, even if the second reading amendment was formally rejected by the Council 
and not incorporated into the final legal text. These examples make clear that 
amendments have to be traced through the complete legislative process. In identifying 
Parliament’s impact, the whole history of an amendment has to be taken into account. 
Hypotheses 
Given the theoretical discussion, the available data and the operationalization of the 
main variables, several hypotheses can be tested. As mentioned above, the main 
empirical implication of the theory is that the EP’s influence should be higher in the 
case of early agreements than in the case where the interaction process followed the 
formal rules more closely. Given the operationalization of the EP’s influence and the 
case selection, the first empirically testable hypothesis can then be stated: 
H1a: The rate of EP amendments adopted is higher in the case of the 
drivers’ license directive than in the case of the driving time 
implementation directive.  
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However, not only the overall rate of adoption should be higher, the differences across 
the two cases should also increase with a higher degree of adoption. A larger 
proportion of amendments should be totally accepted during trilogues than during 
conciliation negotiations. This reflects the assumption that ‘partially’ or ‘largely 
adopted’ amendments are the result of difficult compromise solutions which should be 
more common under conciliation. 
H1b: The difference between the two cases in the rate of EP amendments 
adopted is larger for higher categories of the degree of adoption scale. 
Furthermore, assuming that concessions on recitals are often made to reach a 
compromise where concessions on the substance of the legal text are not possible for 
an actor, a prediction on the amendment success can also be derived for the different 
types of amendments. In such a situation, the adoption ratio of recitals relative to 
articles should be lower in conciliation than in trilogue negotiations: 
H1c: The proportion of recitals among the amendments adopted is lower 
in the case of the drivers’ licence directive than in the case of the driving 
time implementation directive. 
While these three hypotheses concern the expectations with regard to the content of 
the final agreement, which is mostly a result of the behaviour of the Council towards 
Parliament, there are also several implications with regard to the Commission’s 
behaviour. In line with previous research, the rates of amendments accepted by the 
Commission can be examined to test these predictions. It was argued that the 
Commission has hardly any influence on the outcomes of trilogue negotiations, but 
even less so on the outcomes of conciliation committee bargaining. Thus, like the 
Council, the Commission has an incentive to avoid conciliation and will therefore be  
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more lenient towards Parliament’s demands in the case of trilogue negotiations. The 
next hypothesis states this claim more precisely: 
H2a: The rate of EP amendments accepted by the Commission is higher in 
the case of the drivers’ license directive than in the case of the driving 
time implementation directive. 
Another implication of the assumption that the Commission is eager to avoid 
conciliation is that the proportion of amendments accepted by the Commission should 
increase the closer the codecision procedure approaches the conciliation committee 
stage. Therefore, more amendments should be supported by the Commission in 
second reading than in first reading: 
H2b: In the case of the driving time implementation directive, the rate of 
EP amendments accepted by the Commission is higher after the second 
than after the first reading. 
Since the Commission is supposed to be less obstructive during informal trilogues to 
avoid conciliation, another observable implication regards the level of conflict 
between the Commission and the Council as measured by the number of EP 
amendments fully or partially adopted by the Council and accepted to a lesser degree 
by the Commission. It is predicted that, to facilitate the bargaining process, the 
Commission will refrain more consistently from making stronger claims than the 
Council during informal negotiations. 
 H3a: There is less conflict between the Council and the Commission in 
the case of the drivers’ license directive than in the case of the driving 
time implementation directive.  
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Finally, to induce the other actors to reach an early agreement, the Commission is 
expected to be more conciliatory towards EP’s second reading amendments than to its 
first reading amendments. 
H3b: In the case of the driving time implementation directive, there will 
be less conflict between the Council and the Commission after the second 
than after the first reading. 
Having identified a number of empirically testable implications of the theory outlined 
earlier, the next section presents the analysis and discusses the results in the light of 
these expectations.  
IV. The Impact of the European Parliament on Legislation 
In how far are the predictions outlined in the previous section borne out by the data? 
Table 2 lists the number and proportions of EP amendments by their degree of 
adoption for each of the two cases
6. In the case of the implementation of driving time 
directive, only one of the thirty-eight first reading amendments of Parliament were 
fully incorporated into Council’s common position and the overwhelming majority of 
amendments were completely rejected (see column 1). In the second reading, fourteen 
old amendments were not reintroduced, of which two had been totally or largely 
incorporated into the common position. However, there were also twelve completely 
new amendments made by the Parliament in response to changes introduced by the 
Council. Ten of them simply demanded a return to the Commission’s original text, but 
the remaining two constitute compromise suggestions.  
Compared to the first reading amendments, a much larger proportion of the 
thirty-six second reading amendments were eventually accepted by the Council 
(column 3). Indeed, the adoption rates of second reading amendments are very similar  
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to the overall adoption rates of the amendments in the case of the drivers’ licence 
directive (column 5). However, as argued earlier, reintroduced second reading 
amendments cannot be considered to be independent observations. Therefore, 
reintroduced amendments are treated as single observations in the calculation of the 
overall success rate in the case of the driving time implementation directive (column 
4). Taking into account the degree of adoption in first reading, the extent of 
reintroduction in second reading, and the degree of adoption of the second reading 
amendment for the final act, this measure is arguably a better indicator of EP’s overall 
impact on legislation.  
--- Table 2 here --- 
Comparing the overall success rates of EP amendments, the evidence seems to be 
somewhat in favour of our first two hypotheses. Indeed, if an amendment has to be at 
least ‘largely adopted’ to be counted as success, as in previous research (Kasak, 2004; 
Kreppel, 2002), there is a clear corroboration of the main hypothesis (1a). The overall 
success rate of EP amendments is higher in the drivers’ licence which was agreed 
early than in the driving time implementation case which was agreed not until the 
conciliation procedure. Considering the distribution of the degree of adoption across 
the two cases, there is also some evidence supporting hypothesis 1b. The proportion 
of partially or largely adopted amendments is higher in the case with conciliation 
negotiations than in the trilogue case. Overall though, these conclusions depend 
crucially on the cut-point one considers to be sensible for counting an amendment as 
successful and should not be overstated.  
The third hypothesis with regard to the legislative outcome (H1c) states that 
the concessions made to the EP in the case of the driving time implementation  
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directive should concern to a larger extent less important recitals rather than 
substantially binding legal text in form of articles. This hypothesis is corroborated by 
the data as can be seen from table 3. Showing roughly the same division between 
articles and recitals, the two cases differ significantly in the proportion of amendment 
types adopted. As expected, the proportion of article amendments fully or partially 
adopted is considerably higher in the case of the drivers’ licence directive than in the 
driving time implementation directive. 
--- Table 3 here --- 
Turning now to the behaviour of the Commission, table 4 gives an overview of the 
rates of EP amendments accepted by this institution. The data are also in line with the 
two corresponding hypotheses 2a and 2b. In the case of the driving time 
implementation directive, the proportion of amendments accepted by the Commission 
is significantly larger in the second (column 3) than in the first reading (column 2). 
But at the same time, overall support of the Commission is higher in the case of the 
drivers’ licence directive (compare columns 4 and 5). 
--- Table 4 here --- 
However, the picture is less clear-cut with regard to the conflict hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
Again, the proportion of amendments on which the Commission and the Council 
show different opinions decreases from the first to the second reading of the driving 
time implementation directive. This is in line with the prediction, although the very 
small number of conflict instances do not allow for firm conclusions here. However, 
the proportion of non-conflictual amendments is somewhat lower in the case of the 
drivers’ licence as compared to the driving time implementation directive, which 
stands in contrast to the expectation generated by hypothesis H3a.  
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--- Table 5 here --- 
To summarize the results, most findings are consistent with the hypotheses. EP 
influence seemed to be higher in the case of the drivers’ licence directive than in the 
case of the driving time implementation directive. More EP amendments were more 
fully adopted in the drivers’ license case and the differences between the adoption 
rates were larger for fully adopted amendments than for largely or partially adopted 
amendments. Similarly, among the adopted amendments, more referred to the articles 
of the directive rather than to its recitals in the case of the drivers’ license directive. 
Most of the theoretical implications with regard to the behaviour of the Commission 
were also observable. It too accepted more EP amendments in the case of the drivers’ 
licence directive than in the case of the driving time implementation directive. 
Furthermore, the closer the procedure came to conciliation in the latter case, the more 
lenient became the Commission’s behaviour towards Parliament’s amendments. The 
number of instances of conflict between Council and Commission also decrease from 
first to second reading in the driving time implementation case. The only exception 
was the obstructive behaviour of the Commission in the driving license case, which 
was, contrary to expectations, stronger than in the conciliation case. While many of 
the empirical patterns are not very clear-cut, the overall balance of the results lends 
support to the theoretical argument. 
VII. Discussion and Conclusions 
The study argued that the EU institutions make conscious decisions about whether to 
be bound in their interactions by informal institutional rules or follow the formal 
constitutional paths prescribed by the treaty. Regarding the incentives faced by actors  
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making this decision, the basic idea was that the Council’s opportunity costs regarding 
conciliation negotiations are generally higher than those of the EP. Given its limited 
resources in terms of time and personnel available to handle the increasing legislative 
workload of codecision proposals, the Council is expected to focus its attention only 
on those issues that it perceives to be of utmost importance. In contrast, given its 
extensive committee system, Parliament is less adversely affected by a breakdown of 
trilogue negotiations then the Council. As a result, it can extract more concessions in 
terms of policy from its counterparts in informal negotiations. The comparative case 
study lent support to this implication of the theoretical argument. The EP’s influence 
during codecision was indeed found to be larger when agreement was reached at early 
stages in informal trilogue negotiations than when agreement was reached through the 
formal mechanism of conciliation. However, according to the theoretical argument, 
this bargaining advantage is not due to some feature inherent in trilogue negotiations, 
but rather a result of the same factors that lead the actors to engage in informal 
negotiations in the first place. 
The results of the study report rather good news for the proponents of 
increased Parliament influence, and indeed, for the Parliament itself. If the findings 
can be generalized, then first and second reading trilogue negotiations are not only 
more efficient but also allow the Parliament to extract more concessions from the 
Council than through conciliation committee negotiations. But again, if the theory is 
correct, this is not primarily a consequence of the informal institutions governing 
interactions in trilogues, but rather a result of the Council’s incentives to avoid 
conciliation, which are supposed to be stronger than those of Parliament’s. Thus, 
informal trilogues per se are not of advantage to Parliament, but rather the relative  
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impatience of the Council. This means that other formal or informal procedures might 
‘do the job’ of reaching an early agreement just as well as trilogues while at the same 
time avoiding at least some of the negative consequences in terms of decreased 
transparency of the EP’s proceedings. Demands in this direction were already made, 
with some actors in Parliament demanding the ‘presence of Council in committee’ 
(Shackleton & Raunio, 2003). If the theory presented here is correct, the Parliament 
should be in a relatively good position to also gain considerable concessions from the 
Council in the meta-game concerning the rules governing informal negotiations.  
At first sight, this result indicates an increase in the democratic legitimacy of 
EU decision-making, because the Parliament as the most representative institution 
gains additional influence. At the same time, the informal meetings are very effective 
in reaching timely agreements between the institutions However, these positive 
tendencies are outweighed by other negative effects of trilogue negotiations: First, the 
secrecy of these informal negotiations reduces the transparency of EU decision-
making. The Parliament derives its input legitimacy not only from the fact that it is 
directly elected by citizens, but also from the openness of its proceedings. This 
legitimacy ‘advantage’, particularly as compared to the workings of the Council, is at 
least partly lost when the EP negotiates and reaches agreement with the Council in 
private settings. Thus, while increasing the output legitimacy through more efficient 
decision-making, informal trilogues are counterproductive in terms of input 
legitimacy (Héritier, 2003). Given that the Parliament is one of the main proponents 
of transparency and regularly pressuring the other institutions and particularly the 
Council to open up their proceedings to the public, it seems odd that it should engage 
in such opaque practises.   
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Second, informal negotiations empower particular actors and groups within 
the EP, such as party group coordinators (Corbett et al., 2005) and rapporteurs 
(Kaeding, 2004), at the expense of others. In this case, the representativeness gained 
through the increased influence of the EP is at least partly lost because of the biased 
distribution of influence within the EP. The EP as a whole might want to benefit 
further from its image as the most representative and transparent institution in the EU, 
but the potentially larger influence achieved through informal negotiations presents 
incentives to individual members or party groups that have a private interest in 
specific issues to renegade and engage in these negotiations if they have the 
opportunity to do so. The only way out of this dilemma might be a firm self-
commitment by the Parliament to rule out such practices in the form of an amendment 
to its rules of procedure. However, such an amendment presupposes a general interest 
in the EP to change the current situation. This is questionable in the light of recent 
research that showed that some actors within the EP, in particular the larger party 
groups, benefit systematically from these new arrangements (Farrell & Héritier, 
2004). Thus, future research should not only examine the generalizability of the 
current results and further investigate the empirical plausibility of the advanced causal 
mechanism, but also give more attention to the possible effects of informal procedures 
on the relative influence of different actors inside the EU institutions. 
Appendix 
--- Table A1 here --- 
--- Table A2 here --- 
--- Table A3 here ---  
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Notes 
 
 
1 The model focuses on inter-institutional decision-making; the aggregation of 
preferences within institutional actors is of less concern. However, with regard to the 
legitimacy of EU decision-making, exactly whose preferences stand for the 
Parliament’s or the Council’s position is of great importance. This issue of 
representation is discussed in more detail in the conclusion. As a reviewer pointed out, 
the assumption of unitary actors could be questioned, as the negotiation literature 
suggests effects of the internal preference heterogeneity of collective actors on their 
bargaining power. Given that the study considers two cases that are matched with 
regard to the individual actors involved and the type of issue discussed, the empirical 
analysis largely controls for such a potential effect. 
2 The precise titles of the two laws are: Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 March 2006 on minimum conditions for the implementation of 
Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 3820/85 and 3821/85 concerning social legislation 
relating to road transport activities and repealing Directive 88/599/EEC; and Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on driving licences (recasting). 
3 Note, however, that in some cases there is an implicit weighting of important 
changes. For example, the scope of the legal act is often referred to in several parts of 
the proposal, thus one and the same substantial change enters the analysis as several 
observations.  
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4 See table A1 in the appendix. This scale is widely used in previous work on 
amendment success (Kasak, 2004; Kreppel, 1999; G. Tsebelis et al., 2001; George 
Tsebelis & Kalandrakis, 1999). 
5 See tables A2 and A3 in the appendix. Table A2 describes the coding of the degree 
of reintroduction of amendments at second reading and table A3 describes the 
procedure to derive the overall degree of amendment success for the case where 
several readings had been held. 
6 The hypotheses are examined through simple descriptive statistics based on the 
aggregate amendment success of the EP. Given the research question, the unit of 
analysis is the proposal as a whole, not an individual amendment. Thus, the analysis is 
confined to two observations, which does not allow for the application of more 
advanced regression techniques that require larger sample sizes. Even the use of 
qualitative comparative or fuzzy set methods is problematic when the number of cases 
is very small (Häge, 2007). But more importantly, the study controls for many 
additional explanatory factors and potential interactive effects by design, greatly 
reducing the need to use such methods.     
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Table 1  Number of Codecision dossiers broken down by number of reading 
Time period  Total 
codecision 
Dossiers 
concluded at 
1st reading 
Dossiers 
concluded at 
2nd reading 
Dossiers 
concluded at 
3rd reading 
1994-1999  30  --  18 (60%)  12 (40%) 
1999-2000  68  13 (19%)  39 (57%)  16 (28%) 
2000-2001  67  19 (28%)  28 (42%)  20 (30%) 
2001-2002  76  18 (24%)  37 (49%)  21 (28%) 
2002-2003  87  24 (28%)  48 (55%)  15 (17%) 
2003-2004  105  41 (39%)  48 (46%)  16 (15%) 
Total 1999-
2004  403  115 (29%)  200 (50%)  88 (22%) 
Source: European Parliament (2005: 13) 
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Table 2  Incorporation of amendments in text of dossier 
  Driving time implementation     Drivers’ 
licence 
 1
st reading  2
nd reading overall    overall 
Adopted 1  8  6    22 
 2.6  22.2  12.0    23.7 
2 3 6  9  Largely 
adopted 5.3  8.3  12.0  9.7 
3 10  11  10  Partially 
adopted 7.9  27.8  22.0  10.8 
Modified 0  0  0  2 
 0.0  0.00  0.0    2.2 
32 15 27  50  Not 
adopted 84.2  41.  54.0  53.8 
Total 38  36  50    93 
 100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0 
Source: Own data based on documents of the EU institutions. 
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Table 3  Proportion of recitals among adopted EP amendments 
  Driving time 
implementation   Drivers’  licence 
 Article  Recital  Total    Article Recital Total 
Adopted  4  2  6     21  1  22  
  66.7 33.3  100.0    95.5 4.6 100.0 
4  2  6     9  0  9   Largely 
adopted 66.7  33.3 100.0    100.0 0.0  100.0 
10 1 11      9 1 10    Partially 
adopted 90.9  9.1  100.0    90.0 10.0 100.0 
Modified 0  0  0   0  2  2   
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 100.0 100. 
26  1  27     45  5  50   Not 
adopted 96.3  3.7  100.0    90.0 10.0 100.0 
Total  44  6  50     84  9  93  
  88.0 12.0  100.0    90.3 9.7 100.0 
Source: Own data based on documents of the EU institutions. 
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Table 4  Support of Commission for EP amendments 
  Driving time implementation  Drivers’ 
licence 
 1
st 
reading 
2
nd 
reading 
overall overall 
Adopted 12  20  20  50 
 31.6  55.6  40.0 53.8 
4 5 8  5  Largely 
adopted 10.5  13.9  16.0  5.4 
5 2 5  7  Partially 
adopted 13.2  5.6  10.0  7.5 
Modified 0  0  0  9 
 0.0  0.0  0.0  9.7 
17 9 17  22  Not 
adopted 44.7  25.0  34.0  23.7 
Total 38  36  50  93 
 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Own data based on documents of the EU institutions. 
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Table 5  Obstructive behaviour by Commission 
  Driving time implementation    Drivers’ 
licence 
 1
st 
reading 
2
nd 
reading 
overall  Overall 
None   36  35  48    77 
 94.7  97.2  96.0    82.8 
0 1 1  11  Minor 
0.0 2.8 2.0  11.8 
2 0 1  5  Major 
5.3 0.0 2.0  5.4 
Total 38  36  50    93 
 100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0 
Source: Own data based on documents of the EU institutions. 
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Table A1  Coding of degree of adoption by Commission or Council 
Degree of adoption  Numerical 
code 
Adopted (fully adopted)  1 
Largely adopted (more than half of the words adopted)  2 
Partially adopted (less than half of the words adopted)  3 
Modified (change relevant but not in direction of either version)  4 
Not adopted (entirely rejected)  5 
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Table A2: Coding of type of second reading amendment 
Type of second reading amendment  Numerical 
code 
Restores Commission wording  1 
Reintroduces part of earlier amendment  2 
Reintroduces earlier amendment entirely  3 
Reintroduces earlier amendment and suggests new changes  4 
New amendment (not amendments that restore Commission 
wording) 
5 
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Table A3  Coding of overall degree of adoption of amendments 
Type of 2nd 
reading 
amendment 
&  Adoption 2nd 
reading  Æ Adoption overall 
1 & 1 Æ 3 
1 & 2 Æ 3 
1 & 3 Æ 5 
1 & 4 Æ 4 
1 & 5 Æ 5 
2 & 1 Æ 2 
2 & 2 Æ 3 
2 & 3 Æ 3 
2 & 4 Æ 4 
2 & 5 Æ 5 
3 & 1 Æ 1 
3 & 2 Æ 2 
3 & 3 Æ 3 
3 & 4 Æ 4 
3 & 5 Æ 5 
4 & 1 Æ 1 
4 & 2 Æ 2 
4 & 3 Æ 2 
4 & 4 Æ 4 
4 & 5 Æ 5 
5 & 1 Æ 1 
5 & 2 Æ 2 
5 & 3 Æ 3 
5 & 4 Æ 4 
5 & 5 Æ 5 
 
 
 